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The proliferation of free or low-cost investment apps has 
disrupted the financial industry in recent years. Major brokerage 
firms have been pressured to go to zero fees due to intense 
competition from their fintech counterparts. While these apps 
have extended their products and services to those underserved by 
traditional brokers, some of their practices raise consumer 
protection concerns. Namely, the practice of “payment for order 
flow,” which helps fintech startups sustain a zero-commission 
model, could lead to subordinating customers’ best interest to 
market makers who acquire their retail orders from these fintech 
startups. Further, “cash management accounts,” newly popular 
among fintech startups with an ambition to compete with 
chartered banks raise questions about the use of idle customer 
assets and the protections afforded to these accounts in case of 
liquidation. This Note considers the products and services of these 
investment apps in the context of existing U.S. regulations and 
regulators for broker-dealers, investment advisors, and chartered 
banks. To illustrate this, this Note analyzes the potential consumer 
financial protection issues arising out of these fintech-based 
investment platforms’ distinctive business models and the services 
they provide. 
INTRODUCTION 
Robinhood, Acorns, Betterment, Stash, and other free or low-cost 
investment apps make it easier than ever for every smartphone user to 
invest on the go, with zero experience and little more than pocket change. 
These kinds of apps are exploding right now, appealing mainly to young 
people because of their “low barriers to entry, automation and familiar tap-
swipe-buy, Tinder-style interface.”2 For almost all of these apps, all users 
have to do is first download the app, then set up a profile that lets the 
company behind the app know the best kinds of investment suitable for 
the user’s risk averseness and return expectations, and finally connect a 
bank account to give access to some funds and be done. 
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Fintech is defined as “technology-enabled  innovation in financial 
services that could result in new business models, applications, processes 
or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial 
services.”3 With people now spending almost seven times longer on apps 
than on mobile sites and mobile use accounting for an ever-larger portion 
of the time people spend online, the spurt of investment apps is a logical 
development for the fintech industry. 4  Offering an improved user 
experience and greater command over different aspects of money 
management, investment apps are considered by many users as a practical 
and economical way of managing their finances. However, by targeting 
underserved and less sophisticated investors, these low-cost or “free” apps 
can also threaten less vigilant app users who previously lacked exposure 
to the investing world.  
With so many investment apps, online exchanges, and brokerages, 
there are ostensibly an infinite amount of options for people to invest in 
everything from stocks to exchange-traded funds (ETFs) to 
cryptocurrency. The poster child for one of these fast-growing, low-cost 
(or free) online investment platforms is Robinhood. This app boasts a fee-
free model that provides minimal to no cost trading for its customers.5 “As 
part of its easily-accessible, trading-for-the-people model, Robinhood 
doesn’t require an account minimum to trade, and offers commission-free 
trades for users,” contrary to most conventional investment firms. 6 
However, much like a traditional broker-dealer, Robinhood operates under 
a decent amount of regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA).7 The same regulators also have jurisdiction over robo-advisors, 
such as Betterment, a low-cost wealth management company that mostly 
provides its automated investing service through an app as well.8 
The proliferation of these free or low-cost investment apps has 
disrupted the financial industry in recent years. Major brokerage firms 
have been pressured to eliminate fees. Since Robinhood offered stock 
trading for free in 2013,9 Vanguard Group slashed fees on ETF trades, and 
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J.P. Morgan Chase started its own free trading app.10 In October 2019, 
traditional broker-dealers, the likes of Interactive Brokers, Charles 
Schwab, TD Ameritrade, and E*Trade announced, within less than a week 
of one another, that they would cut commissions to zero. 11  While 
Robinhood does not directly collect commissions from customer’s trading 
activities, it does monetize through a variety of other avenues including 
“marginal interest and lending, premium accounts and rebates.”12 One of 
the more controversial channels is “payment for order flow,” where online 
brokerages outsource the execution of their app users’ orders to firms that 
pay for the right to handle those trades in exchange for a fee. 13  “All 
brokerage firms that sell order flow are required by the SEC to disclose 
who they sell order flow to and how much they pay.”14 
Even though all these fintech startups offered more specialized 
and tailored products from their inception, most of them have bigger 
aspirations and wish to replace conventional players in the financial 
industry eventually and become customers’ central financial partner. SoFi, 
Inc., for example, has expanded its services and product lines to 
mortgages, life insurance, and wealth management, together with student 
loan refinancing, the startup’s focus when it launched.15 Robinhood, now 
with more than six million users, has rolled out a high-yield cash 
management account and ultimately wants to become a federally chartered 
national bank.16 These new commercial banking products and services 
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I. FINTECH AND THE RISE OF INVESTMENT APPS 
A. How Fintech Start-Ups Innovated and Disrupted the Online 
Brokerage and Robo-Adviser Market 
The advent of fintech promises to reshape the financial industry 
by reducing costs, improving the quality of financial services, and creating 
“a more diverse, secure and stable financial services landscape.”17 “The 
use of digital technologies [and big data in fintech] makes it possible to 
provide many existing financial services more efficiently and to enhance 
these services.”18 S&P Global divides fintech activities into six types: 
payments, financial media and data solutions, banking technology, 
insurance technology, digital lending, and investment and capital markets 
technology. 19  Of the six fintech subsectors that S&P Global Market 
Intelligence tracks, the investment and capital markets technology 
subsector produced the most transactions in 2017, totaling roughly $181 
billion in assets under management (AUM).20 The AUM in the subsector 
is projected to be $608 billion in 2022.21 
The move to low-fee and even no-fee models is a common theme 
among retail-focused apps in the investment and capital markets 
technology subsector. Among the field, Robinhood stands out as one of 
the fastest-growing investment apps since introducing its commission-free 
business model in 2015.22 Meanwhile, incumbents such as Fidelity and 
Charles Schwab have since cut their equity and ETF commissions.23 The 
free or low-cost model is considered one of the truly disruptive changes in 
the investment technology landscape, and its impact appears to be 
ongoing. For instance, JPMorgan’s You Invest, launched in August 2018, 
offers customers 100 commission-free online stock and ETF trades. 24 
Further, fintech startups like Robinhood are willing to waive commissions 
 
17  Arup Kumar Chatterjee & Poornima Jayawardana, How FinTech Can 
Accelerate Financial Inclusion in Indonesia, ASIAN DEV. BLOG (Apr. 2018), 
https://blogs.adb.org/blog/how-fintech-can-accelerate-financial-inclusion-
indonesia. 
18 Stulz, Rene M., FinTech, BigTech, and the Future of Banks 1. (Fisher Coll. of 
Bus. Working Paper No. 26312, 2019). 
19 See Katie Darden, Nimayi Dixit, & Tom Mason, 2018 US Fintech Market 
Report, S&P Global Market Intelligence 1, 4 (2018), https://www.spglobal.com/ 
marketintelligence/en/documents/2018-us-fintech-market-report.pdf. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
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to Go Global, TECHCRUNCH (May 7, 2015), https://techcrunch.com 
/2015/05/07/free-stock-trades/ 
23 See Mark DeCambre, Fidelity Cuts Fees to $0 as It Jumps on Zero-commission 
Bandwagon, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com 
/story/fidelity-cuts-fees-to-0-as-it-jumps-on-zero-commission-bandwagon-2019-
10-10. 
24 Meet You Invest: A New Way to Trade Online Commission-Free, JPMORGAN 
CHASE & CO. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.jpmorganchase.com 
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free.htm. 
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if they could amass a larger customer base as a result.25 That is because, 
with a large pool of active users, fintech startups can still sustain 
themselves by tapping into several other revenue streams available to 
traditional brokers, including “securities lending, interest on cash held in 
brokerage accounts, margin lending and routing order flow to 
exchanges.”26 
Fintech startups in the investment and capital markets technology 
subsector also can differentiate themselves from their traditional 
counterparts with “personalized niche services, data-driven solutions, an 
innovative culture, and a nimble organization.”27  They have little to lose, 
can innovate rapidly, and do not fear mistakes. Fintech startups are also 
willing to accept more feedback from their users and focus on interfaces 
that maximize customer experience.28 An important factor that enables 
fintech firms to innovate more rapidly is that the digital technologies they 
rely on have huge built-in economies of scale.29 With digital technologies, 
the marginal cost of one more customer is generally trivial. Therefore, as 
long as these firms have a large enough client base to ensure that their total 
revenue is larger than their total cost, which doesn’t increase by much as 
more users sign up for their products, they do not have to predicate the 
availability of their products on the basis that every user individually has 
to contribute to their revenues. That leads to one of the most significant 
advantages to these digital-exclusive micro-investing platforms: they can 
afford to let users bypass brokerage account minimums and extend their 
products to those underserved by traditional brokers because of the user’s 
lack of funds.30 
B. Overview of the Regulatory Framework for Online Broker-
Dealers and Robo-Advisors 
Fintech firms have been provided with a favorable regulatory 
environment since the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, traditional 
financial institutions have been subject to more rigorous regulation, capital 
requirements, and reporting requirements from regulators since 2008. 
“The looser regulatory requirements imposed on fintech startups allow 
them to provide more customized, inexpensive, and easy-to-access 
financial services to consumers than traditional institutions.” 31  The 
predominant revenue sources for these online broker-dealers and robo-
advisors are individual customers and small and medium-sized 
enterprises,32 therefore making consumer protection a focal point of the 
regulatory scheme around them. 
 
25 See Darden, supra note 19, at 5. 
26 Id. 
27 In Lee & Yong Jae Shin, Fintech: Ecosystem, Business Models, Investment 
Decisions, and Challenges, 61 BUSINESS HORIZONS 35, 36 (2017).  
28 See Anirban Bose, Penry Price, & Vincent Bastid, World FinTech Report 2018, 
Capgemini, LinkedIn & Efma 1, 19 (2018), https://www.capgemini.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/world-fintech-report-wftr-2018.pdf. 
29 Stulz, supra note 18. 
30 See Jolly, supra note 2. 
31 See Lee & Shin, supra note 27, at 37–38. 
32 Id. 
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Fintech startups face different regulatory requirements based on 
the type of financial services they provide. For instance, Robinhood, as a 
broker-dealer, is regulated by the SEC. 33  Additionally, the app is a 
voluntary member of FINRA34, a self-regulatory organization (SRO) that 
oversees many brokerages. Therefore, along with other similar investment 
apps, Robinhood is required to deal fairly with their customers and have a 
fiduciary duty “under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws 
and SRO rules, including SRO rules relating to just and equitable 
principles of trade and high standards of commercial honor.”35  
An important aspect of a duty of fair dealing to their clients is the 
suitability obligation, which requires a broker-dealer to make 
recommendations consistent with customer interests.36 Broker-dealers are 
also required under certain circumstances, such as when making a 
recommendation, to disclose material conflicts of interest to their 
customers, in some cases at the time of the transaction’s completion.37 
“The federal securities laws and FINRA rules restrict broker-dealers from 
participating in certain transactions that may present particularly acute 
potential conflicts of interest.”38  
Money on Robinhood is also protected by the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC), which protects up to $250,000 for cash 
claims and $500,000 for securities.39 FINRA and SEC report to SIPC 
concerning member broker-dealers who are in or approaching financial 
difficulty. 40 “If SIPC determines that the customers of a member require 
the protection afforded by the Act, it initiates steps to commence a 
customer protection proceeding.”41 
Other digital investment apps providing automated, algorithm-
driven investment services with little to no human supervision, like Acorns 
or Betterment, are considered robo-advisors and must register with the 
SEC as “Registered Investment Advisors” (RIA). Most robo-advisor apps 
are members of FINRA as well, and depending on the services they offer, 
may have a separate entity as a broker-dealer to execute their users’ 
trades.42  Assets managed by robo-advisors are not insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as they are securities held for 
investment purposes, not bank deposits.43 However, assets managed by 
 
33 See Sraders, supra note 5. 
34 Id. 
35  SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-DEALERS iv (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/913studyfinal.pdf. 
36 Id. at 59. 
37 See id. at 60. 
38 Id. at iv. 
39 See Lorie Konish, Robinhood Debate Highlights the Difference between FDIC 
and SIPC Protection, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com 
/2018/12/14/robinhood-debate-highlights-differences-in-fdic-and-sipc-
protections.html. 
40  SIPC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2019), https://www.sipc.org/media/annual-
reports/2018-annual-report.pdf. 
41 Id. at 4. 
42 See Betterment Res. Ctr., supra note 8. 
43 See Konish, supra note 39. 
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robo-advisor apps are typically protected by the SIPC for up to $500,000 
per account against missing assets.44 
As RIAs, these robo-advisors have a fiduciary duty to serve their 
app users best interests, including an obligation not to subordinate the 
user’s interests to their own.45 A robo-adviser “that has a material conflict 
of interest must either eliminate that conflict or fully disclose to its users 
all material facts relating to the conflict.” 46  Further, the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 “prohibits an investment adviser, acting as principal 
for its own account, from effecting any sale or purchase of any security for 
the account of a client, without disclosing certain information to the client 
in writing before the completion of the transaction and obtaining the 
client’s consent.”47 
  The rise of digital investment and personal finance startups` could 
pose a set of unique challenges to financial regulation. Fintech startups 
present a particularly acute problem from a systemic risk perspective.48 
Their size and business models leave them more vulnerable to adverse 
economic shocks than large financial institutions, and those shocks are 
more likely to spread to other firms in the industry.49 
II. THE PRICE OF COMMISSION-FREE TRADING: THE “PAYMENT FOR 
ORDER FLOW” MODEL 
A. The “Race to Zero:”: Elimination of Online Trading 
Commissions 
Due to the built-in economies of scale of fintech startups and the 
digital technology they employ, the marginal cost of serving one more 
customer is generally smaller than the same marginal cost for more 
established competitors. Investment apps, including Robinhood and 
Acorns, have accumulated and drawn millions of users, mostly younger 
people, by marketing themselves with commission-free or low-cost 
investing and being mobile-friendly.50 Conversely, since the start of 2013, 
the year of Robinhood’s launch, traditional broker-dealers have seen a 
lower return for their investors, partially due to the increased competition 
from fintech startups with a zero-commission business model. 51  For 
instance, both Charles Schwab and TD Ameritrade have had returns below 
S&P 500 levels since 2013, averaging 11 percent per year.52  Charles 
 
44 See id. 
45 See STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISORS AND BROKER-DEALERS, supra note 35, 
at iii. 
46 See id. 
47 Id.  
48  William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171–72 
(2018). 
49 Id. at 1172. 
50 Sraders, supra note 5; see also Dan DeFrancesco, Investing App Acorns Nabbed 
$105 Million in Funding and Now Has a Higher Valuation than Robo Giant 
Betterment, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/acorns-raises-105-million-in-funding-2019-1. 
51 See Fitzgerald, supra note 10. 
52 Id. 
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Schwab returned a ,mere 7.9% between 2013 and 2019, while TD 
Ameritrade fared worse at just below 5% a year in the same period.53 
Dubbed the “Robinhood effect,” the intense competition from 
digital investment and personal finance apps have pressured major 
brokerages to eliminate transaction fees, with many cutting commissions 
altogether.54 So how can fintech startups like Robinhood sustain this zero-
commission model without incurring huge losses or going bust? 
Without receiving any commission directly from its app users, 
Robinhood can still tap several other revenue streams available to broker-
dealers: “securities lending, interest on cash held in brokerage accounts, 
margin lending and routing order flow to exchanges.”55 In particular, the 
practice of sending customer orders to high-frequency traders in exchange 
for cash is a controversial but legal in the brokerage industry known as 
“payment for order flow.”56 Robinhood credited this practice as the reason 
they made free trading possible: “The revenue we receive from these 
rebates helps us cover the costs of operating our business and allows us to 
offer commission-free trading.” 57 In fact, the app was bringing in more 
than 40% of its revenue in early 2018 from selling its customers’ orders to 
high-frequency trading firms or market makers, like Citadel Securities and 
Two Sigma Securities.58 
B. The “Payment for Order Flow” Practice and Its Risk to 
Consumers 
“Payment for order flow” is the widespread practice in which 
over-the-counter (“OTC”) market makers make cash payments to retail 
brokerage firms in exchange for marketable retail customer order flow.59 
These market makers are typically large financial institutions that act as 
wholesalers by buying and selling securities to satisfy the 
 
53 Id. 
54 See Fitzgerald, supra note 9. 
55 See Darden, supra note 19, at 5. 
56 See Sraders, supra note 5. 
57 A Letter from Robinhood Co-Founder & Co-CEO Vlad Tenev, ROBINHOOD, 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://blog.robinhood.com/ news/2018/10/12/a-letter-from-
robinhood-co-founder-amp-co-ceo-vlad-tenev. 
58 See Sraders, supra note 5. 
59 Exchange Act Rule 10b-10 defines “payment for order flow” to include “any 
monetary payment, service, property, or other benefit that results in remuneration, 
compensation, or consideration to a broker or dealer from any broker or dealer, 
national securities exchange, registered securities association, or exchange 
member in return for the routing of customer orders by such broker or dealer to 
any broker or dealer, national securities exchange, registered securities 
association, or exchange member for execution, including but not limited to: 
research, clearance, custody, products or services; reciprocal agreements for the 
provision of order flow; adjustment of a broker or dealer’s unfavorable trading 
errors; offers to participate as underwriter in public offerings; stock loans or 
shared interest accrued thereon; discounts, rebates, or any other reductions of or 
credits against any fee to, or expense or other financial obligation of, the broker 
or dealer routing a customer order that exceeds that fee, expense or financial 
obligation.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)–10(d)(8). 
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market.60 Market makers earn most of their revenues by charging a spread 
on the buy and sell price and transacting on both sides of the market.61 
Investors who want to buy securities get charged the asking price, which 
is always set marginally higher than the market price. 62  The spreads 
between the price investors receive and the market prices are the profits 
for the market makers.63 
Market makers are particularly interested in order flow from the 
retail sector because retail investors are, on average, less informed than 
other traders about short-term price fluctuations. 64  Therefore, trading 
against retail investor order flow enables market makers to take advantage 
of information asymmetries between market participants and reliably 
profit from people who are not professional traders.65 “Typically, dealers 
that pay to receive retail customer order flow will guarantee executions of 
that order flow with some amount of average price improvement over the 
national best bid or offer (“NBBO”) and with a separate payment to retail 
brokers for directing customer orders to them.”66 
The SEC has stated that a broker-dealer does not necessarily 
violate its best-execution obligation merely because it receives payment 
for order flow.67 At the same time, the SEC has stated that the existence of 
payment for order flow raises the potential for conflicts of interest for 
broker-dealers handling customer orders.68 To date, the SEC has pursued 
an approach based primarily on disclosure to address concerns about the 
potential conflicts of interest caused by the practice of “payment for order 
flow.”69 
As the SEC has stressed, a broker-dealer’s order-routing decisions 
are subject to its duty of best execution.70 That duty requires a broker to 
seek to execute a customer’s order at the most favorable terms reasonably 
available under the circumstances.71  Broker-dealers must also conduct 
regular and rigorous reviews of their order-routing practices and execution 
quality.72  
 
60  Barclay Palmer, Broker vs. Market Maker: What's the Difference?, 





64 Memorandum to Equity Market Structure Advisory Committee: Certain Issues 
Affecting Customers in the Current Equity Market Structure, at 6, SEC (Jan. 26, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/equity-market-structure/issues-affecting-
customers-emsac-012616.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Payment for Order Flow, Final Rules, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
34-34902 (Oct. 27, 1994), 59 FR 55006, 55009 (Nov. 2, 1994). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 SEC, Best Execution, Investor Information-Fast Answers, SEC (May 9, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersbestexhtm.html. 
71 See Payment for Order Flow, supra note 67. 
72 Id. 
No. 1]              DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW             52 
          There can be material economic incentives for a broker to send its 
marketable retail orders to market makers that pay for order flow. “These 
economic incentives create potential conflicts with a broker’s duty of best 
execution and may cause observers to question the rigor with which a 
broker seeks to obtain the best execution for its customer orders.” 73 
Without payment for order flow, it is possible that market makers could 
have been motivated to quote more competitively, which means retail 
investors could have received better prices for their orders.74 The other 
side of the argument claimed that the practice of payment for order flow 
benefit investors indirectly “by subsidizing low commission rates and 
other services the customers receive from their brokers.”75 Additionally, 
retail marketable orders routed pursuant to payment for order flow 
arrangements are generally executed at a faster pace and more often than 
not at the NBBO or better.76 
C. Robinhood’s Substantial Engagement in the Practice of 
“Payment for Order Flow” 
According to Robinhood’s Fourth Quarter 2019 SEC Rule 606 
Disclosure Report, no customers specifically instructed their orders routed 
to a particular venue for execution. 77  Conversely, that quarter, TD 
Ameritrade routed only 32% of its customer’s orders to market makers.78  
Per Robinhood’s quarterly report, users’ trades were all routed to high-
frequency traders like Citadel Securities (65.5%), Wolverine Securities 
(11.66%), and Virtu Americas (6.82%).79 Of these market makers, Citadel 
was fined $22 million by the SEC for securities law violations in 2017;80 
Wolverine Securities paid a $1 million fine to the SEC for insider 
trading;81 and as of December 2018, Virtu Americas settled disciplinary 
proceedings involving more than 50,000 instances of trading violations 
and was censured by FINRA for trading violations.82 
Not only does Robinhood engage in the practice of payment for 
order flow, but the company appears to be selling their app users’ orders 
for over ten times as much as other brokerages who engage in the 
 
73 See Memorandum, supra note 64, at 9.  
74 Id. at 9–10.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Robinhood Financial LLC, SEC Rule 606 Report Disclosure Fourth Quarter 
2019, ROBINHOOD, https://cdn.robinhood.com/assets/robinhood 
/legal/RHF%20SEC%20Rule%20606%20Report%20Disclosure%20-
%20Q4%202019.pdf [hereinafter Robinhood Rule 606 Report]. 
78 TD Ameritrade, Inc., SEC Rule 606 Report Disclosure Fourth Quarter 2019, 
TD AMERITRADE, https://www.tdameritrade.com/retail-
en_us/resources/pdf/AMTD2055.pdf. 
79 See Robinhood Rule 606 Report, supra note 77. 
80 See Kane, supra note 14. 
81 Id. 
82  Leah McGrath Goodman, Wall Street Firm Founded by Trump's Army 
Secretary Nominee Violated Trading Rules for Years, NEWSWEEK, (Jan. 15, 
2017), https://www.newsweek.com/wall-street-firm-trump-army-secretary-
nominee-violated-trading-rules-538630. 
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practice.83 Among broker-dealers that route their order flow to market 
makers, the practice typically only constitutes a small percentage of their 
revenue.84 But for Robinhood, selling customers’ orders to high-frequency 
trading firms constituted more than 40% of its revenue. 85  More 
concerningly, unlike any other brokerages, in 2018, the app started filing 
Rule 606 disclosures on order flow payments for dollars traded rather than 
shares traded, making it impossible to compare Robinhood’s payments 
with others.86 
In the Third Circuit case Newton v Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith,87 the court held that “[t]he duty of best execution . . . requires 
that a broker-dealer seek to obtain for its customer orders the most 
favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances.” In that 
case, the market maker executed their customer’s orders at the NBBO 
price when they knew that price was inferior, and at the same time, they 
were trading at the more favorable price for their own accounts.88 The 
court ruled that brokerages are not allowed to inflate their profit margins 
at the expense of their investor clients in this way.89 
Although Robinhood itself does not seem to be engaging in the 
same practice as the market maker in Newton, the high-frequency traders 
they sell to are essentially using Robinhood as an intermediary without 
directly breaching their duty of best execution since these orders are routed 
to them and not directly from the app users, taking advantage of the retail 
investors by only offering the NBBO price instead of the best price they 
can obtain. Glaringly, Robinhood has a substantial conflict of interest here: 
the company has the duty of best execution to obtain for its users the most 
favorable price reasonably available. But at the same time, Robinhood is 
getting significant rebates from these high-frequency traders, which use 
their technological advantage to exploit the order flow they get indirectly 
from retail investors who use Robinhood. Robinhood in turn benefits from 
indulging in this practice, since the significant revenue it gets supports the 
company’s commission-free business model and helps expand its client 
base. 
In fact, Robinhood was fined $1.25 million fine by one of its 
regulators in December 2019, FINRA, which charged the brokerage with 
not following “best execution” practices from October 2016 to November 
2017. 90  FINRA charged that in this timeframe, Robinhood did not 
reasonably consider where it could find the highest-quality trades for its 
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users, focusing only on existing routing partners that paid Robinhood for 
orders instead of exploring alternatives. 91  It further commented that 
brokerages that engage in the practice of “payment for order flow” are 
obliged to either conduct an order-by-order review or implement a 
“regular and rigorous” review program.92 Robinhood responded that this 
is no longer a problem for its current users and that the company had since 
implemented a better way to match traders with best-execution practices.93   
Robinhood has also claimed in December 2019 that it is also a 
clearing broker and does not need to route its users’ trades to market 
makers.94 However, as of its latest quarterly report, Robinhood is still 
routing all its users’ trades to high-frequency traders.95 
III. BRANCHING INTO COMMERCIAL BANKING: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 
There is a growing trend of fintech startups adding banking 
options to their product and service offerings. In recent years, Robinhood, 
Coinbase, and Circle have announced their intentions to pursue national 
banking charters.96  No doubt, these apps hope to build a larger user base 
on top of its existing millions of users by leveraging software scalability 
to provide more competitive returns and pricing than the traditional 
players in the banking sector. But so far, fintech startups have made scant 
progress toward winning banking charters, particularly as regulator 
concerns over digital financial services have grown.97 Some members of 
the U.S. Federal Reserve have voiced concerns over fintech’s risk 
management capabilities.98  Consequently, fintech startups with ambitions 
of operating a full-service bank have few alternatives to pursue.  
In December 2018, Robinhood unveiled its no-fee checking and 
savings accounts with no minimums, ATM fees, penalty charges, or 
foreign transaction fees.99 Noticeably, the app was also offering a 3% 
interest rate, which was well above the industry average 0.08% yield on 
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However, the fine print on its website inconspicuously stated that the 
offering was not a bank account.101 Robinhood stated in its disclosures that 
these “checking and savings accounts” would have been covered by the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). 102  But these new 
products saw swift opposition from regulators who questioned the 
promised SIPC insurance, which is meant for brokerage accounts—not for 
savings products. 103  Only a day after its launch, Robinhood said they 
would re-brand and re-name these products after the “confusion.”104 
To engage in the business of banking—taking deposits and 
making loans—fintech startups typically require a bank charter in their 
name.105 The bank charter comes with some major benefits. Under existing 
U.S. law, only chartered depository institutions have exclusive rights to 
take insured deposits from the public, which provides an extremely cheap 
source of funding.106 Besides, insured depository institutions (IDIs) can 
also export interest rates nationwide under the Exportation Doctrine, since 
expanded to permit state and national banks to preempt a various states’ 
consumer-financial-protection laws.107  
The absence of a bank charter also means that fintech startups 
cannot avail itself of the preemption powers, forcing them to comply with 
the laws of each state in which they intend to provide their banking 
services.108 Consequently, the most common business model for startups 
has been to enter into a partnership with a relatively small chartered bank, 
enabling them to operate on a much wider scale without the added burden 
of state-by-state compliance. 109  Robinhood, SoFi, Betterment, 
Wealthfront, and CreditKarma have all launched FDIC-insured, high-
yield accounts this year by partnering with a bank.110 
These high-yield cash management accounts and savings accounts 
have similarities. They “sweep” customers’ money from a brokerage 
account into various FDIC-insured bank accounts.111 Because these firms 
deposit the money across multiple banks, the insurance can be higher than 
the standard $250,000 offered per bank. In Robinhood’s case, accounts are 
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Goldman Sachs, HSBC Bank, Wells Fargo Bank, Citibank, Bank of 
Baroda, and U.S. Bank.113 
There are two potential consumer protection issues for these app-
based “cash management accounts” or “sweep programs.” The first is 
broker-dealers’ use of idle customer assets. The second concerns the 
different SIPC and FDIC protections afforded to these accounts in case of 
liquidation. 
Regarding the first issue, SEC Rule 15c3-3(e) requires that 
broker-dealers place all customer cash in a separate bank account titled the 
“Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive Benefit of 
Customers.”114 Broker-dealers can circumvent the requirement to place 
customer funds into a “Special Reserve Account for the Exclusive Benefit 
of Customers” by “sweeping” customer cash off their books and 
depositing the funds into either a bank or a money market fund.115 This 
explains high interest “cash management accounts” offered by these 
fintech startups. Current SEC rules protect customers by ensuring that they 
are informed about sweep programs before their funds are swept. 116 
Although FINRA has not finalized its sweep program rules, the self-
regulatory organization has proposed rules which would strengthen the 
existing SEC customer protection requirements by requiring that 
customers know the most important terms of the sweep products, namely 
the interest rate and the sweep counterparty.117 
Affiliate banks incentivize investment apps to encourage users to 
participate in so-called “cash management accounts” by offering paid fees 
or other benefits to sweep customer cash even if sweeping their uninvested 
cash is not in the best interest of the users. Depending on users’ risk profile, 
returns may not adequately compensate them for the counterparty risk 
created by sweeping the cash.118 Additionally, these investment apps could 
also choose banks and money market funds that pay higher fees or offer 
more benefits for their future development but lower returns to customers 
when compared to the industry.119 Right now, per SEC and FINRA rules, 
the onus is on users’ and not the app to understand the risks associated 
with sweep programs.120 
The second issue concerns the difference between SIPC and FDIC 
protections. In December 2018, when Robinhood rolled out its no-fee 
checking and savings accounts with 3% interest rate, it disclosed that the 
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accounts would be covered by the SIPC.121 However, SIPC’s CEO swiftly 
responded that it would not insure checking and savings accounts the way 
Robinhood had claimed. 122  Consequently, Robinhood retracted that 
controversial launch, and returned in October 2019 to offer cash 
management accounts, which are similar to savings accounts.123 This time 
around, the product is covered by the FDIC rather than the SIPC through 
Robinhood’s partnership with various chartered banks.124 
This debacle highlighted the crucial difference between the 
protections offered by the FDIC and SIPC. The FDIC, which began 
operations in 1933, administers deposit insurance and the fund reserved to 
protect deposits and resolve failed banks, known as the Deposit Insurance 
Fund.125 After the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the standard maximum 
deposit insurance amount is $250,000 per ownership account category, per 
depositor, per institution. 126  Therefore, the FDIC insures individual 
deposits in one insured bank separately from individual deposits in another 
separately chartered insured bank. 127  For example, if a person has a 
certificate of deposit at Bank A and has a certificate of deposit at Bank B, 
the amounts would each be insured separately up to $250,000. 128 
However, funds deposited in separate branches of the same insured bank 
are not separately insured.129 
Conversely, SIPC, on the other hand, was created by the Securities 
Investor Protection Act in 1970 to protect a broker-dealer’s customer from 
the loss of cash and securities if the broker-dealer has to be liquidated.130 
SIPC’s guarantees apply only to the broker-dealer’s custody function, 
which means SIPC only would cover customers’ cash and securities in 
their brokerage accounts when the firm enters liquidation.131 SIPC’s CEO, 
therefore, determined that its insurance would not apply to “checking and 
savings accounts” of Robinhood because the insurance saw the money put 
into these accounts as loans by customers to the investment app, and not 
cash or securities that are in their brokerage accounts.132 Additionally, 
SIPC does not insure individuals in the event their securities’ value 
declines.133 It also does not cover consumers who were sold worthless 
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investments, received bad advice, or steered toward inappropriate 
investments .134 These carve-outs and caveats further highlight SIPC’s 
diminished consumer protections compared to the FDIC. So, before 
signing up for a new “cash management account,” users should read the 
fine print and carefully choose their insurance coverage in the event their 
chosen finance app’s company goes into liquidation. 
Another area to keep an eye on for the future regulatory landscape 
is the proposed special charter for non-bank fintech companies (the 
“fintech charter”) by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
as a possible avenue for fintech firms to access the nationwide financial 
system without having be licensed in all 50 states.135 The so called “fintech 
charter” was recently struck down by a judge of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, holding that the fintech 
charter is beyond the OCC’s authority.136  The fate of the charter however, 
is still pending from an appeal by the OCC.137 
CONCLUSION 
Low-cost or free investment apps are here to stay. Despite 
increased scrutiny of risk management and consumer protections 
practices, dubious behaviors and shady revenue streams remain the 
lifeblood of fintech startups. As they continue to generate higher 
investment returns and supplant established industry players, 
confrontations with regulators like FINRA will become increasingly 
common. Robinhood was FINRA’s first causality for failing to follow its 
fiduciary duties, but it will surely not be the last.138  The rise of “cash 
management accounts” and associated “sweep programs” promise to be 
new hotbeds for trouble in the consumer protection space.   
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